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BRIEF STATEMENT RE APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final decision in a civil matter arising from
the Second District Court, Davis County. This case was originally filed in the
Utah Supreme Court and the case was transferred to the Utah Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §782a-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) [hereinafter referred to as "UCA"].
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT
The appellate courts in Utah are to accord no particular deference

to the trial court's legal conclusions, Hoth v. White. 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 53
(Ct. App. 1990), Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467,
(Utah 1989), but should not set aside the factual findings unless they are
against the clear weight of the evidence. Id.
H.

DEFENDANTS WAIVED RIGHT TO ASSERT DEFENSE
WHICH WAS NOT PLEAD
Defendants never raised the defense that the Notice of Lien did

not comply with the Mechanic's lien statute in any of their pleadings. Since it
was not plead, then the Defendants waived this defense and they should have
been unable to present this defense at the trial. Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of
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Civil Procedure [hereinafter "URCP"]; Creekview Apartments v. State Farm
Ins. Co.. 771 P.2d 693 (Utah App. 1989); Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah
1986); Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co.. 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983);
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr.. 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984).
HI.

TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED CLAIM BASED
UPON MECHANICS LIEN
Under §38-1-7, UCA. a notice of lien claim is to set forth:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known, or,
if not known, the name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was
employed or to whom he furnished the
equipment or material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor was
performed . . . ;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for
identification; and
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his
authorized agent and an acknowledgment or
certificate . . . .
The trial court concluded that the Notice of Lien was defective.

The defects it found (R.309-317, Amended Findings of Fact 23, 26, 27, and 28)
[a copy of said Lien is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit "D", and
incorporated herein by reference] relate to the Plaintiffs compliance with
subsections (b) and (e).

2

Since, in any event, the Lien was in substantial compliance with
the lien statute, see, Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp.. 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983),
and Roberts Investment Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Prod. Co.. 449 P.2d
116 (Utah 1969), then the Lien satisfies the law and should have been
enforced by the lower court, and attorneys fees and costs should have been
awarded.
IV.

DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO
ASSERT DEFENSES AT THE TRIAL BECAUSE THEY DID
NOT SIGN THEIR ANSWER AS REQUIRED BY RULE 11
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike in which they sought to have the

Defendants' Answer stricken because it was not signed. Rule 11, URCP.
provides that "[i]f a pleading . . . is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is

. . ." .

The Court erred in not striking this answer.

This failure was

exacerbated because the court let the Defendants present evidence in support
of their defenses at the trial. Rule 11, URCP.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was brought in March, 1990 by Floor Coverings by
Certified, Inc., a Utah corporation [herein referred to as "Floor Coverings" or
as the "Plaintiff] (R.309-3P, Amended Finding nj Furl 2* against Stacy B.

3

Morgan and Kristin P. Morgan [herein referred to jointly as "the Morgans" or
as the "Defendants"], who are individuals residing in Davis County, Utah.
(R.309-317, Amended Finding of Fact 1)
The Morgans are presently the owners in fee of certain real
property which serves as their residence, and is located at 773 South 825 East,
Layton, Utah [referred to herein as to "the Property"]. (R.309-317, Amended
Finding of Fact 4) The Morgans purchased said property from Richard Miles
Construction and Development, which sale closed on November 24, 1989,
pursuant to an Earnest Money Agreement that had been signed in May of
1989. (R.T.P. 80, 192-93).
The Morgans were told by Richard Miles Construction to make
their own arrangements for floor coverings to be purchased and installed at
the Property. (R.T.P. 99, 159-160). The Morgans contacted Don Smith, a
carpet manufacturers' representative, regarding installing carpet. (R.T.P. 50,
51, 53, and 55) Mr. Smith told the Morgans that he could arrange for Floor
Coverings to procure and install the carpet for them. (R.T.P. 56) It is the
practice of Floor Coverings to deal directly with the customers and not with
their builder. (R.T.P. 19)

The trial court found that the Morgans had

purchased the carpeting from Don Smith. (R.309-317, Amended Finding of
Fact 7)
4

In October ol' 1989, Floor Coverings was first contacted regarding
making improvements on said Property, in particular, the installation of vinyl
floor coverings and carpeting. (R.T.P. 11) On or about the 15th day of
November, 1989, Plaintiff furnished the first materials and labor and, on or
about Nover -"• 1/, 1^89, Plaintiff furnished the last of said materials and
labor as required at said Property. (R.309-317, Amended Finding of Fact 3)
Despite demand therefore, Defendants did not pay the sums due
and owing for said labor and materials. (R.309-317, Amended Finding of

Lien to be filed with the Office of the Davis County Recorder [Entry No.
880784, Book 1332 Page 818, a true copy of which is attached hereto, marked
as Exhibit "D", and incorporated herein by reference, herein "Notice of Lien"].
(R.309-317, Amended Finding of Facts 12) Plaintiff duly mailed a copy of
said Notice of Lien to Defendants by certified mail. (R.T.P. 25)
Defendants were originally billed $2,115.00. (R.309-317, Amended
Finding of Fact 11) The Morgans later advised Floor Coverings that they
were thought the area liad been incorrectly measured and a step was not
properly laid. (R.T.P. 20) There was a meeting between the parties on March
23, 1990 at which the Plaintiff fixed the problem with the step and went
through the measurement of the job. (R.T.P. 20, 160, and Plaintiffs Exh. 11)
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At that time, the parties agreed that Floor Coverings would subtract $75 from
the bill and that the Defendants would pay the principal sum of $2,040.
(R.T.P. 21)
At that time, Defendants owed the agreed principal sum of
$2,040.00, plus interest at ten (10%) percent per annum from November 17,
1989, a recording fee of $100 for the Notice of Lien, court and foreclosure
costs, and attorney's fees, for the materials and labor furnished towards the
improvement of said Property. (R.T.P. 29-30)
In the litigation, Plaintiff sought (among other things) for the trial
court to enter an order allowing them to foreclose on the mechanic's Lien
which had been filed against the Property. Initially, the Morgans filed an
unsigned pro se answer [a true copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "E"
and incorporated herein by reference] (R.21-22, Plaintiffs Exh. 11), in which
they asserted as defenses:
1.

They were only acting as agents for Miles Construction when

they went through Don Smith to have the carpeting and vinyl installed at their
place and the agreement was with Don Smith, not Plaintiff;
2.

They were not acting as a general contractor;

3.

Miles Construction had a bond;

4.

They were not the owners of the subject property at the time

6

they ordered the job; and
5.

They were not unjustly enriched.

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, [or in the
alternative, Motion to Strike Pleading under Rule 11] on about May IS, 1990
(R.26-28) and mailed a Request for Ruling relative thereto on or about June
5, 1990. (R.61-63) A few days later the Morgans mailed Plaintiff a check,
non-cashiers, for $2,040. (R.T.P. 20, Defendants' Exh. 1) Plaintiff did not
know if the check would clear, and decided to hold on to the same until after
the Judgment was entered, and then apply it against the sums due thereunder,
which was done. (R.l 11-126)
Subsequently, the Morgans proceeded with a Motion to set aside
the Judgment under Rule 60(b) (R.80-88), which was granted by the Court.
(R.140-142)

Thereaft'•

Plaintiff again iikd a Motion lor Summary

Judgement or to Strike the Morgan's unsigned Answer (R.146-148), which was
denied, without setting a deadline for the Morgans or their attorneys to sign
the Answer. (R.196-197) The Morgan's counsel never sought to amend their
Answer, before, during or after I he trial and no one ever signed the Answer
that was filed by the Morgans.
Eventually, this case came on for trial before Judge Cornaby
without a jury on May 31, 1991. He held that there was no contract between

7

the Plaintiff and Floor Coverings, did not rule with respect to the failure of
the Morgans to have a bond, and determined that the Plaintiff was entitled to
a judgment based upon unjust enrichment. On the mechanics lien cause of
action, the court held that the Lien was not enforceable because it did not
comply with the mechanics lien statute. (R.309-317, Amended Conclusion of
Law 3) The trial court found these shortcomings in the Notice of Lien:
1.

the signature of the corporate Plaintiff was the signature of

an individual only;
2.

the corporate officer did not state under oath that the

contents of the lien were correct;
3.

the notary was the person "who swore or affirmed to me that

he signed it voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the document is truthful";
4.

Plaintiff incorrectly listed the Morgans as the persons by

whom they were employed [although they believed the Morgans hired them];
and
5.

Plaintiff did not list the correct amount owing on the lien.

(R.309-317, Amended Findings of Fact 23, 26, 27, and 28 and Conclusions of
Law 3 and 4).

&

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The lower court erred when it granted the Judgment because:
1.

The Defendants waived their right to assert that the Notice

as a defense, the issue was not tried by consent and the Defendants never
sought relief to have their Answer amended.
2.

The Notice of Lien satisfies the statutory requirements, but

to the extent it docs not, il was in substantial romplianre with the law.
3.

A judgment should have been entered against the Morgans

because they did not have a contractors bond.
4.

The Defendants Answer should have been stricken under

present evidence in support of their defenses at the trial.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner asserts the following points of law in support hereof:
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellate Courts in Utah are to accord no particular

deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, Hoth v. White. 142 Utah Adv.
Rep ^ i (Ct. App. 1990), Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782
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R.T.2d 467, (Utah 1989), but should not set aside the factual findings unless
they are against the clear weight of the evidence. IdH.

DEFENDANTS WAIVED RIGHT TO ASSERT DEFENSE NOT
PLEAD
No pleading exists wherein the Defendants set forth allegations

that (1) the Notice of Lien was illegal or unenforceable due to its failure to
comply with the Mechanic's lien statute or (2) the Plaintiff released or waived
the right to enforce the same.
Rule 12(h), URCP. sates that "[a] party waives all defenses and
objections that he does not present either by motion [under Rule 12(b)]... or
by his answer". Rule 9(c), URCP. requires a party to affirmatively plead a
long list of defenses, including illegality, release and waiver, "and any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."
A matter constitutes an "avoidance" that must be plead when it
suggests that the "complaint is invalid for other reasons not embraced by the
pleading".

Creekview Apartments. 771 P.2d at 695. "Affirmative defenses"

generally are those assertions which could have the effect of defeating or
tending to defeat the claim on its merits [propositions that the defendant may
interpose to defeat plaintiffs prima facie case]. First National Bank v. Higgs.
406 So.2d 673 (La.App. 1981); W.R. Grace Co. v. Scotch Corp.. Inc.. 753
10

S.W.2d 743 (TexApp.-Austin 1988).
In reading the Plaintiff's Complaint (R.l-14) it does not appear
from its face that the Notice of Lien would be unenforceable due to its failure
to comply with the Mechanics Lien statute or due to a release or a waiver of
Plaintiffs rights. In fact, to establish such a defense, the Morgans had to
prove, among other things, that (a) the amount stated on the face of the
Notice of Lien was not correct and (b) the Floor Coverings contract for the
carpet and vinyl was with Mr. Smith and not with them. It was not apparent
from the Complaint that the Notice of Lien was somehow unenforceable for
these reasons.
Since the illegality defense was not embraced by the Complaint, it
was an avoidance that had to be either plead or waived under the Creekview
Apartments analysis. Moreover, such a claim of illegality would have the
effect of defeating the Plaintiffs mechanics lien claim on the merits and was
an affirmative defense that had to be plead.

Under the Utah case law,

a defendant would not have to raise such a claim in his pleading if the issue
had been tried by express or implied consent of the parties. Mabey v. Kay
Peterson Constr. 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). However, in the case sub judice
the Plaintiff [in their Trial Memorandum] specifically objected to the
Defendants presentation of the claim that the Notice of Lien did not comport
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with the relevant statute, since this defense had not been plead. Thus, the
Plaintiff did not consent to the presentation of this defense and the same was
waived by the Defendants.
Further, the Defendants could have sought to amend their Answer
to add this defense under Rule 15(b), URCP. Id.. No such action was taken
before, during or after the trial in the present case.
The Defendants waived this defense, and they should not have
been able to present the same at the trial, and the trial court committed error
when it made findings of fact and reached a legal conclusion based upon a
waived defense.
m.

TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED CLAIM BASED
UPON MECHANICS LIEN
A.

CONTESTED FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiffs do not contest Finding of Fact 23 [amount listed on lien
as being owed is incorrect].
Plaintiff contests these portions of Finding of Fact 26: (a) the
signature of the corporate Plaintiff was that of an officer only;

(b) the

corporate officer did not state under oath that the contents of the lien were
correct; and (c) the notary was the person "who swore or affirmed to me that
he signed it voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the document is truthful".
The only testimony that had any relevance on this issue was that of Alan
12

Delahunty, who said that he had been an officer for Floor Coverings by
Certified, a Utah corporation, for some years. (R.T.P. 10). The only other
evidence on the issue was the Notice of Lien itself [Exhibit "D"]. Set forth
below are the reasons why the trial court's analysis of the Lien was incorrect.
Plaintiff contests Finding of Fact 27 [Lien did not list the person
by whom the Plaintiff was employed]. The court made this finding because it
believed that the Morgans had hired Don Smith, not the Plaintiff. Although
Plaintiff does not believe this scenario was correct, they do not contest that
Don Smith was hired by the Morgans.

However, this is not the complete

picture of what happened. Even if the Morgans hired Mr. Smith, Plaintiff still
contests that the Lien did not list the correct person who hired them for the
reasons set forth below.
Plaintiff contests Finding of Fact 28 [Lien was unenforceable],
although this is really a conclusion of law, for the reasons set forth below.
B.

FIRST ALLEGED DEFECT

Under §38-1-7, UCA. a notice of lien claim is to set forth:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known, or, if not
known, the name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or
to whom he furnished the equipment or material;
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(c) the time when the first and last labor was performed . .
•>

(d)
a description
identification; and

of the property, sufficient

for

(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized
agent and an acknowledgment or certificate . . . .
The first defect found by the trial court in the Notice of Lien was
that amount claimed as being due and owing was incorrect.
At the time the Lien [Exhibit "D"] was prepared, Plaintiff believed
that $2,115 was the correct amount due and owing.

Later, after being

contacted by the Morgans, Floor Coverings re-measured the area at the
Defendants home with their assistance and the parties agreed to reduce the
bill by $75 [to $2,040]. When the summary judgment was granted, Plaintiff
sought the entry of a judgment with a $2,040 principal.
Subsequently, after the trial court heard the testimony of four
different carpet layers with respect to the finding of a reasonable
measurement and per yard rate, it found that the correct amount for unjust
enrichment purposes was $1,959.60, which is about $80 less than the parties
had agreed and $150 less than was reflected on the original Lien.
First, the lien statute does not require a Notice of Lien to set forth
the amount they claim is owed on the job. As a general proposition, a
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claimant is not required to satisfy any tests that are not specifically set forth in
the mechanic's lien law. Buehner Block v.Glezos. 310 P.2d 517 (Utah 1957) [if
notice satisfies the statutory requirements, then it does not have to set forth
any other information which might be useful or desireable]. Even if Plaintiff
was required to set forth the amount claimed, where the amount claimed is
within about seven percent [7%] of the amount later found by the court to be
correct, then the amount claimed in the Lien was in substantial compliance
with the lien statute, see, Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp.. 660 P.2d 721 (Utah
1969), and Roberts Investment Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Prod. Co..
449 P.2d 116 (Utah 1969). The Defendants did not produce any evidence at
trial that the filing of a Lien that contained a claim that was slightly more than
what was owed had any adverse effect on them. The Lien in the present case
satisfies the law in this regard and should have been enforced by the lower
court.
C

SECOND ALLEGED DEFECT

The next defect found by the trial court in the Notice of Lien was
that the persons listed on the Lien [the Morgans] were not the ones who hired
Plaintiff, although Plaintiff believed the Morgans had hired them [relating to
sub-part (b)].
The mechanics lien statute allows the lien claimant an option to
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list the "name of the person by whom he was employed or [the name of the
person] to whom he furnished the equipment or material" §38-1-7(b), UCA
[emphasis added]. Even if the Morgans were not the persons who hired Floor
Coverings, they were the persons to whom the material was furnished. This
result follows from the fact that the trial court entered a judgment against the
Morgans based upon unjust enrichment (R.309-317, Amended Conclusion of
Law 4) because they were the persons who had benefited from the installation
of the carpet and vinyl. Therefore, by listing the Morgans on the Lien as the
persons to whom Floor Coverings furnished the materials, the second part of
subsection (b) is satisfied. The lower court erred in finding that the Notice of
Lien was defective in this regard.
Additionally, at the time the Lien was prepared, it was Floor
Covering's understanding that they were being employed by the Morgans.
However, the trial court determined that the Plaintiff had actually been
employed by Don Smith, the carpet broker who was acting as the Morgans
operative with regard to the purchase and installation of the vinyl and carpet.
Even if Plaintiff was not directly employed by the Morgans, they were
indirectly employed by the Morgans because Don Smith retained them for the
Morgans' benefit. (R.T.P. 147 - 150, Plaintiffs Exh. 11) Plaintiff was not
hired to install carpet at Don Smith's house, but at the Morgans house, so he
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must have been acting as the Morgans' agent when he retained them for this
job. Therefore, the Plaintiff was correct in listing the Morgans as the persons
by whom they were employed.
In any event, the Notice of Lien would be in substantial
compliance with the lien statute and should have been enforced.
D.

THIRD GROUP OF ALLEGED DEFECTS

Judge Cornaby found the following technical problem with Lien:
(a) the signature of the corporate Plaintiff was that of an
officer only.
Assuming arguendo that this items is required by law, then in
interpreting a notice of lien," all parts of the notice should be read together
and in a consistent manner. The Notice of Lien in this case states that:
NOTICE: . . . The undersigned Floor Coverings by Certified, Inc.
hereby gives notice. . . .

Floor Coverings
Corporate Seal
s/ Wayne Dudley
Secretary

*

*

*

*

#

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

FLOOR COVERINGS BY
CERTIFIED, INC.

s/ Alan Delahunty
Authorized Officer

17

The notarized acknowledgment on the next page of the Lien
contains the following language:

"before me, the undersigned notary,

personally appeared Alan Delahunty, as the Vice President of Floor Coverings
by Certified, Inc., who . . . signed the preceding document in my presence
and who swore or affirmed to me . . . that the document was signed on
behalf of said corporation by authority of a Resolution of the corporation's
board

of directors

and

acknowledged

that THE

CORPORATION

EXECUTED THE SAME and that the seal affixed is that of said
corporation". The Lien is signed by two different corporate officers and the
corporate seal has been affixed.
There are no facts in the record, nor does the face of the Lien
support the view that, Alan Delahunty was signing the Lien individually, or, in
any fashion, except in a representative capacity on behalf of the Plaintiff.
Finally, the lower court found these technical problems with the
Notice of Lien:
(a)

the corporate officer did not state under oath that the

contents of the lien were correct;
(b)

the notary was the person "who swore or affirmed to me that

he signed it voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the document is truthful".
The notarized acknowledgment on the second page states that:
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"before me . . . appeared Alan Delahunty, as the Vice President of Floor
Coverings . . . who signed the preceding document [Notice of Lien] in my
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that he signed it voluntarily for its
stated purpose, that the document is truthful".
This language places grave doubts on the trial court's conclusion
that the corporate officer did not state under oath that the contents of the
Lien were correct.
Finally, the duly notarized acknowledgment contains the following
language: "before me, the undersigned notary, personally appeared Alan
Delahunty, as the Vice President of Floor Coverings . . . [whose identity was
appropriately established] to be the person who signed the preceding
document in my presence and who swore or affirmed to me that he [Alan]
signed the document voluntarily for its stated purpose, that the document is
truthful, and that the document was signed on behalf of said corporation ..."
In sum, Mr. Delahunty personally appeared before the notary, his
identity was verified by the notary, and then Alan swore to the notary that he
signed the preceding document [the Notice of Lien] in the notary's presence,
voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the document was truthful. The phrase
"preceding document", of necessity, refers to the Notice of Lien. The notary
did not sign the preceding Lien. Thus, in contrast to what the trial court
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concluded, Alan Delahunty, and not the notary, was the person who swore or
affirmed that he signed the Lien voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the
Lien is truthful.

Certainly the language in the acknowledgment is in

substantial compliance with the lien requirements, and the lower court erred
when it concluded otherwise.
A very similar mechanics lien notary provision was reviewed for
compliance with the lien statute in the case of In re Williamson. 43 B.R. 813
(Bktrcy.Ct.D. Utah 1984) and it was upheld as being an enforceable lien.
Moreover, the Utah Department of Business Regulation issued a
document in 1988 entitled the Utah Notary Public Guide, which contained
copies of various recommended forms for Notary Certificates [Exhibit "F"].
Forms A, B, and C set forth therein are almost identical to the certificate that
is at issue in this case. The reason for that is because, when the Plaintiffs
notice of lien was drafted, the drafter relied upon these Notary Guides in
preparing the "certificate". Certainly, where an administrative body has puts
forth its interpretation of what will satisfy the law that is within its purview
then that interpretation should be presumed to be correct. Morton Internat.
v. Auditing Div. of the

Utah Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

Therefore, it was error for the trial judge to conclude that the Notice of Lien
was not in substantial compliance with the statute.
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Since the mechanics lien statute should be interpretated in the
most liberal and comprehensive manner in favor of the lien claimant, 53
AmJur.2d Mechanics Liens. §§ 18 and 23; Frehner v. Morton. 424 P.2d 446,
18 Utah 2d 422 (1967), then the trial court erred on the lien issue.
IV.

JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENTERED BASED
UPON FAILURE TO HAVE A BOND
The Defendants in their Answer [Exhibit "E"] dated April 4,1990,

state that "[o]n March 23, 1990, we [the Morgans] reached an agreement with
Floor Coverings regarding disputed invoice and service." The testimony of
Alan Delahunty was that he meet with the Morgans on that day, there was a
problem with the carpet on one step and the Morgans had a question about
the amount of material that was installed. (R.T.P. 20) He fixed the step to
their satisfaction and the parties measured the job together. (R.T.P. 21) They
discovered that there had been an error that resulted in the bill being $75 too
large, and a credit was given, leaving as balance of $2,040. (R.T.P. 21) The
Morgans indicated that they were satisfied with the measurements. (R.T.P. 21)
They sent their Answer just a few days after the meeting. Subsequently, the
Morgans sent Plaintiff a check that was in the sum of $2,040, which was a
clear indication of what the Morgans understood the agreement to be.
The Morgans made no further claims that they were dissatisfied
with the carpet measurement until after they retained counsel [who is in the
21

carpet business].
Since the Morgans stated in their Answer, which was never
amended, that they had reached an agreement on the measurement issue,
then they are estopped from raising this issue further. A general rule applied
in judicial matters is that a party will not be allowed to take a position on a
matter that is directly contrary to one which he previously assumed, where he
is chargeable with knowledge of the facts and another will be prejudiced
thereby. 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §68; Estate of Ghristensen v.
Christensen. 655 P.2d 646 (Utah 1982); Caldwell v. Anschute Drilling Co.. 13
Utah 2d 177, 369 P.2d 964 (1962). As a result of this estoppel, the agreed
amount due on the materials was $2,040. The Plaintiff would not have
pursued the construction bond claim if they had known that the Defendants
were going to repudiate this agreement.
The Plaintiffs material was used on the Property, the value of the
improvements exceeded $2,000.00 and Defendants did not obtain a bond for
said improvements. (R.309-317, Amended Finding of Fact 24) This action was
contrary to the requirements of Utah Code Unannotated §14-2-1 (1991), and
the Morgans are liable therefore. John Wagner Associates v. Hercules. Inc..
797 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1990); Pierce v. Pepper. 17 Utah 2d 123, 405 P.2d
345 (1965).
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Under §14-2-1, UCA. the Morgans were owners who were obliged
to obtain a contractor's bond on this job but did not do so. The failure to
plead and prove the existence of such a bond results in a judgment being
awarded under said law, and with an award of attorneys fees and costs. Triple
I Supply. Inc. v. Sunset Rail. Inc.. 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982). The trial court
was mistaken when it concluded otherwise, and the judgment should be
reversed and fees awarded according to the proof at the trial.
V.

DEFENDANTS

WAIVED

DEFENSES

IN

UNSIGNED

ANSWER
After the Defendants retained counsel, Plaintiff filed a second
Motion to Strike sought to have the Defendants' Answer stricken because it
was not signed. Rule 11, URCP. provides that "[i]f a pleading . . . is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader . . . . " .
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to
Utah's Rule 11. A leading treatise states that all pleadings must be signed and
"a typewritten name . . . is not sufficient". Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure §1333. In the event a party fails to sign a pleading, such an
omission "will result in its being stricken, unless it is signed promptly after
notice of the failure is given to the party or attorney". Moore's Federal
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Practice f 11.002[1].
Therefore, the Court erred in not striking the Morgans' unsigned
answer.

This failure was exacerbated because the court allowed the

Defendants to present their defenses at the trial. Rule 11, URCP.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the preceding argument, the lower court's judgment
should be reversed to the extent it denied Plaintiff the right to foreclosure as
prayed on the mechanics lien against the property of the Morgans [with a
deficiency if necessary], and for their failure to have a bond, and judgment
should be entered for Plaintiff, in the sum of $2,040, and with an award for a
fee for filing and recording the Notice of Lien [$100], for foreclosure costs, for
all pre-judgment costs, and for an award of attorneys fees through the end of
the trial in accordance with the evidence that was introduced at the trial, and
for an award of fees and costs following the trial and for the appeal, and for
after accruing fees and costs.
DATED this 5th day of May, 1992.
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR
& ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

Paul Franklin Farr
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the foregoing
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, first class,
to:
Steve C. Vanderlinden, Esq.
STEVE C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
1133 North Main, Suite 200
Layton, UT 84041
this 5th day of May, 1992.

Paul Franklin Farr
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Steven C. Vanderlinden #3314
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendants
1133 North M a i n , Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone (801) 544-9930
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, :
INC.,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

:

vs.

:

STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN
P. MORGAN,

:
:

Civil No. 900747303CN
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendants.

:

The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 31st
day of May, 1991, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District
Court Judge. The Court, having previously entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGES and DECREES
judgment against the Plaintiff in the sum of $80.40, together with
post-judgment costs and interest.
DATED this js^f

day of

/y^-^Jc^

, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

P7

JUEGS2E37 EUTEEED
^D
c:\wp\docs\misc\morgan.fof

ouglasirj/Cornaby
District Court Judge

0053935
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Steven C. Vanderlinden #3 314
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendants
1133 North Main, Suite 2 00
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone (801) 544-9930
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, :
:
INC. ,
:
Plaintiff,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT

vs.
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN
P. MORGAN,

:

Civil No. 900747303CN
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 31st
day of May, 1991, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District
Court Judge.

The Plaintiff was present and represented by his

attorney, Paul Franklin Farr. The Defendants were also present and
represented by their attorney, Steven C. Vanderlinden.

The court

having heard testimony by both parties, and their witnesses, and
having received exhibits as evidence, and the court having reviewed
the testimony of the parties and good cause appearing, hereby
enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Defendants are residents of Davis County, Utah.

2.

The Plaintiff was a corporation

duly

organized and

validly existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its

principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and
was, at all times relevant, in the retail floor coverings business
[hereinafter referred to sometimes as "Floor Coverings11 ].
3.

On or about the 15th day of November, 1989, Plaintiff

furnished the first materials and labor and, on or about November
17, 1989, Plaintiff furnished the last of said materials and labor
in performing the job [Invoice 2702] at the Property,
4.

The property located at 773 South 825 East in Davis

County, Utah [hereinafter the "Property"] was a residence, and the
Defendants1 closed on their purchase of the same on November 24,
1991.

Defendants were the owners of said Property at the time the

Notice of Lien was recorded against the same.
5.

That Plaintiff thought the prices to be paid to them for

the installation and the purchase of the carpet was $11.25 and the
price to be paid for the purchase and the installation of vinyl was
$9.75.
6.

That the Defendant thought that the price to be paid to

Plaintiff for the purchase and installation of the carpet was
$10.75 per yard and $9.75 per yard to purchase and install the
vinyl.
7.

That the Defendants believed they were entering into a

contract with Don Smith and the Plaintiff believed they were
entering into a contract with the Defendants.
8.

That

no

contract

existed

Defendants.
-2-

between the Plaintiff and

9.

On November 24, 1989, at the closing of the Defendant's

home, the Defendants paid Miles Construction Company Contractor
$1,500.00 for the purchase and installation of the carpet and vinyl
for their home.
10.

In June, 1990, Miles Construction

Company

gave the

Defendants $1,500.00 for the carpet and vinyl that was purchased
in their home so that the Defendants could send the money on to the
Plaintiff.
11.

Plaintiff sent the Defendanrs an invoice [Invoice No.

2702], relating to said job, shortly after the work was completed
on November 17, 1990 seeking the immediate payment of the same.
The amount asserted to be owing therein was $2,115.00.
12.

Since said invoice was not paid by Defendants, then

Plaintiff mailed a Preliminary Notice of Intent to File a Lien to
the Defendants about January 3, 1990. On January 19, 1990, Floor
Coverings caused a Notice of Lien to be filed with the Office of
the Davis County Recorder [Entry No. 880784, Book 1332, Page 818,
hereinafter "Notice of Lien"].
13.

On June 12, 1990, Defendants sent Plaintiff a check for

$2,040.00 for the carpet and vinyl purchased and installed in their
home by the Plaintiff.
14.

That the Plaintiff urged the Court to find an accord and

satisfaction pursuant to the Answer filed by the defendants on
April 9, 1990. The Court did not do so. This action was filed on
March 15, 1990.

On March 23, 1990, Allen Delahunty and Stacy
-3-

Morgan met at the property. A step was repaired and the floor was
remeasured.

At the conclusion the Plaintiff agreed to deduct

$75.00 from the bill due to its error.

The balance due was

$2,040.00.
15.

That on June 26, 1990, the Court received the Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment, to strike Defendants' Answer, and for
default judgment.

Also filed on the same date was an Affidavit

signed by Alan Delahunty.

The Plaintiff's attorney also signed

this Affidavit wherein he claimed to have mailed a copy to the
Defendants on May 18, 1990. That on June 10, 1990, the Defendants
mailed to Plaintiff's attorney, Paul Franklin Farr, a check for
$2,040.00

to

settle the matter.

The

Defendants

mailed

the

$2,040.00 check to the Plaintiff in an offer to settle the .case,
although no writing expressed such intention.

The Court awarded

the Plaintiff judgment on August 1, 1990 for $2,040.00 plus $136.00
interest, plus lien costs $100.00, plus lien foreclosure costs of
$308.00, plus a reasonable attorney fee of $1,000.00.
was $3,584.00.

The total

The Plaintifffs counsel held Defendants1 check

until after the judgment was awarded and then cashed it on August
7, 1990.

On October 11, 1990, Steven C. Vanderlinden made an

appearance for the Defendants and filed a Motion to Set Aside the
Summary Judgment.

On October 18, 1990, the Plaintiff caused a

public sale to be made of Defendants property pursuant to the
judgment.

The Plaintiff's attorney bid $3,855.10 at the public

sale, claiming that to be the amount owing.
-4-

The Court found the.

actions of Plaintiff's attorney outrageous and granted a temporary
restraining order.
16.

That Defendants have acknowledged from the beginning that

they owed the Plaintiff money for the carpet and vinyl installed
in their home but have consistently claimed it was less than the
$2,115.00 claimed by Plaintiff.
17.

That the Plaintiff billed the Defendant for 50 yards of

vinyl at $9-75 per yard for a total of $487.50 and 13 0 yards of
carpet at $11.25 per yard for a total of $1,463.53. The total for
both the carpet and vinyl was $1,951.00 before taxes, and $2,115.00
with taxes and $40.00 miscellaneous fees.
18.

That

after

the

liens

had

been

filed,

Plaintiff

acknowledged a $75.00 error in its calculations and stated that his
bill should be $2,040.00.
19.

That because there was no contract between the parties,

and different prices were discussed, the Court determined that
$9.75 per yard for the purchase and installation of the vinyl is
reasonable and $11.25 for the purchase and installation of the
carpet is reasonable.
20.

Three expert witnesses were called on the total yardage

of carpet and vinyl installed in the home, none being a party to
the lawsuit.

Said witnesses testified that they went to the home

to measure the carpet.

Dennis Vanderlinden testified that there

was 121.3 yards of carpet installed with a value of $1,3 64.94, and
40 yards of vinyl installed for a purchase price of $3 90.00 and a

total price of the carpet and vinyl of $1,754.94.

David

Searle

<

testified

that

there

was

122.2

yards

of

carpet

for

a value

of

C

$1,374.75 and 45 yards of vinyl for a value of $438.75 for a total
^
wn

purchase price for both the carpet and vinyl of $1,813.50.

Dean

C
UJ

Chidester testified that there was

118.67 yards of carpet for a

Z
C

- value of $1,335.04 and 40 yards of vinyl for a value of $390.00 for
a total purchase price of $1,725.04.
o
5
<
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21.

That the difference between the high and the low figures

testified to in court is approximately $150.00.
22.

That the difference in the amount owed is significant to

the Defendants.

8
CN

p|

23.

That the amount owed in the notice lien is incorrect,

24.

That no one testified as to whether or not there was a

? I

bond in place.

Z I

25.

I

However, the Court assumes that there was no bond,

That the lien statute does not require privity

the parties and Plaintiff properly

between

listed the Defendants as the

<\\
UK
H,
<
||
p

owner or reputed owner of the property,
when the labor was performed, November 17, 1989, and gave a proper
26. That the lien filed by the Plaintiff correctly stated
description of the property, however, " the signature of the

SI

corporation is the'signature of an officer only.

u I

officer does not state under oath that the contents of the lien are

<11

correct.

§ |

swore or affirmed

The notary on the

lien

to me that he

is the person w h o
signed

all

stated purpose, and the document is truthful."
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states

it voluntarily,

Q

^||

The corporate

for

"who
its

27.

That Plaintiff incorrectly listed the person by whom he

was employed even though he believed the Defendants were the ones
that hired him.
28.

That based on the above, the lien is unenforceable.

29.

Plaintiff is to be paid for unjust enrichment in the

amount of $1,800.00 plus $40.00 preparation and the appropriate
sales tax of $119.60 for a total amount to be paid of $1,959.60.
30.

That Plaintiff presently has in his possession $2,040.00

of Plaintiff's money meaning the Plaintiff owes the Defendant
$80.40.
31.

That each party is to bear their own attorney's fees and

costs incurred herein.
32.

That the previous sum deposited with the Court in the

amount of $3,855.10 is to be returned to the Defendants.
33.

Shortly after the work was completed on November 17,

1990, Plaintiff mailed

Defendants1

immediate payment of the same.

Invoice 2702,

The Plaintiff

seeking the

asserted that

$2,115.00 was the correct principal amount then due and owing.
34.

Thereafter, no payment was made by the Defendants within

the next thirty days. As a result, Plaintiff contacted Defendants
to request payment.35.

In this case no payment was thereafter made and Plaintiff

sent Defendants a Preliminary Notice of Intent to file a lien.
36.

In the sale of the carpeting for installation at the

Property, Plaintiff acted with the expectation of being compensated
-7-

therefor

in an amount equal to the reasonable

value of the

materials and services furnished, and it was not acting as a
volunteer.
37.

The Notice of Lien was filed within the time required by

the mechanics1 lien statute and on or about January 19, 1990,
Plaintiff mailed a copy of said Notice of Lien to Defendants by
certified mail.
38.

The Lien showed what the Plaintiff believed at the time

the Lien was prepared and recorded[that the principal amount due
and owing was the sum of $2,115.00].
The Court having entered its FINDINGS OF FACT, hereby enters
its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the District Court had jurisdiction over the above-

entitled matter.
2.

That Plaintifffs lien filed in the above-entitled lien

is void and unenforceable.
3.

That there was no contract existing between the Plaintiff

and the Defendants and therefore no bond was necessary.
4.

That the Plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $1,959.60

on the theory of unjust enrichment.
5.

That

the

Defendant

has

previously

tendered

to the

Plaintiff $2,040.00 leaving a net amount due and owing to the
Defendant of $80.40.
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6.

That the Defendant is entitled to receive back the check

previously deposited with the Court in the amount of $3,855.10.
7.

That neither party is entitled to attorneyfs fees or

court costs.
DATED this fL?

day of

/
^-^^'

1991,

'Ss

BY THF COURT:
/
^L~*U-

»>^y^

-- "'Dougi^s-^/. Cornaby
District Court Judge
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NOTICE
To:

Paul Franklin Farr
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Busch Forum, Suite 54 0
5295 South 320 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711

You are hereby notified that pursuant to the rules of the
Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504, you have five (5) days after
receipt of these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment to file an Objection.
DATED this / 7 ^ d a y of

(^)^4r^>^^

c:\wp\docs\misc\morgan.fof
-Q-

1991.

Paul Franklin Farr (#1040)
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 540
BUSCH FORUM
5295 South 320 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711
Telephone: (801) 263-5555
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH

FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED,
INC.,

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

Civil No. 900747303CN

)

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Plaintiff,
v.
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN
P. MORGAN,
Defendants.

TO THE PARTIES HERETO, BY AND THROUGH
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND TO THE COURT:

THEIR

RESPECTIVE

YOU are hereby notified that the above-entitled Plaintiff hereby appeals to
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the Order and Judgment entered in this
action on October 29, 1991.

DATED this 26th day of December, 1991.
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed, first class, postage prepaid to:
Steve C. Vanderlinden, Esq.
1133 North Main, Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041
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CAROL DEAN PAS* DAVIS CNTY RECORDER
1990-JAN 1? 3:01 Ftt FEE 9.00 DE? JS
fiEC'O FOR FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED I

WEEK RECORDED, MAIL 1C:
FLCOH COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, INC.
P.O. BOX * - r - # 5 2 6 2 5 6
SALT LAO CITY, UTAH - - - - - ^ 8 4 1 5 2
NOTICE:

JAN 19 1990

SEND COPY CF NOTICE CF LIEN BY CERTIFIED MAIL,
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED, TC CWEER.
The undersigned Floor Coverings by C e r t i f i e d ,

Inc.

hereby gives notice of i n t e n t i o n to hold end d a i s a l i e n upon
the property and improvements thereon owned and reputed to be
owned by S t a c e y B. & K r i s t i n P . Morgan
and located
in
" uavis
County, Utan, wmca property i s mere
p a r t i c u l a r l y as follows:

SEE ATTACHED EXSIEIT "A"

Exhibit "A" is attached hereto and incorporated
herein bv reference- The .amount demanded hereby is
$ $2,115.00 owing to the undersigned for labor and materials
to improve the above described property.
. The undersigned was emLoyed by Stacy B & Kristin P. Morgan
who was the (owner) (contractor)/ such being done by tae
undersigned under a contract made between said (owner)
(contractor) and the undersigned by the terms and conditions of
wtuca the undersigned did agree to furnish floor coverings in
consideration of payment to the undersigned of $ $2,115.00
upon completion of the job and under which contract the first
labor and materials were finished on the 15th day
of
November , 198 9 and the last labor and materials were
furnished on. the l7thday of November 1583 end for all of
which labor and materials the undersigned became entitled to
$ $2,115.00 Wfcich is the reasonable value thereof, and on
which payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed
amounting to $ - 0 - .
leaving a balance owing to the
f.
^^^oi^ersigned of ? $Z, 115.00 after deducting all just credits
4
and for which demand the undersigned holds and
t J^i%%* &B& fbffsets,
7/^*^;^
by virtue of the provisions of Chapter h Tit]
Title
FHDGR COVERINGS By
CERTIFIED, INC.

'i(SEAL)

/

Secretary

itnorized Officer

E; BB0734-

STATE OF UTAH

BK ± 3 3 2

)
SSt

County of Salt Lake)

"before me, the undersigned notary,
On this 1 I day of
.Ian
Delammty,
\
Vice
President
of Floor Coverings
personally appeared Alan
. mw _ _
__
_
w
by Certified, Inc., who is personally known to me (or whose identity
was satisfactorily proved to me) to be the person who signed the
preceding document in my presence and who swore or affirmed to me
that he signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose, that the document
is truthful, and that the document was signed on behalf of said
corporation by the authority of a Resolution of the corporation's
board of directorsand acknowledged that the corporation executed
the same and that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation.

..•; J • • •

;^-(S2AL');*

£'

xy ^QAMJU
NoxaryTFublic
My Commission Expires

. 3/iz/fz.

'ptowi'&v&U*ty&6y Sentenced, Inc.
3003 HIGHLAND DRIVE

SALT LAKECITY, UTAH 84106
P. O. BOX 6256
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RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIL
NO INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVIOED
NOT FOR INTERNATIONAL MAIL
(See Reverse)
Sent to

Stacey B & K r i s t i n P. Morgah
sat and No.,

W-825 E.

T

P.O., State and ZIP Code

g L*yhnn TTtah fl^f&l
Postage

^

Certified Fee

>/9

Special Delivery Fee
Restricted Oelivery Fee

w

Return Receipt Showing
to wnom and Oate Oeiivered
Return receipt snowing to wncm,
Oate. and Address of Oelivery

i*yq

TOTAL Postage ana Fees
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postmaster
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April 4, 1990

_

To Whom It May Concern;
This is in reply to summons served upon Stacey and Kristin Morgan
regarding Floor Coverings by Certified, Inc., vs., Stacey B.
Morgan and Kristin P. Morgan. On November 24, 1989, we purchased
a home from Richard Miles Construction and Development. Prior to
purchase, Miles Co. authorized us to make arrangements for floor
coverings to be installed at 773 S. 825 E. Layton. We made an
agreement with Don Smith for floor coverings. The agreement
included price and quantity. Don Smith then contacted Floor
coverings and instructed them to contact us to arrange for
installation.
Upon receipt of an invoice for service and material on or about
December 1, 1989, we forwarded the invoice to Miles Co. At that
time we contacted Floor coverings^regarding discrepancies in
billing and unsatisfactory work. Floor Coverings subsequently
contacted us again, whereby we contacted Miles Co. regarding
payment. Floor Coverings then sent preliminary notice to lien,
whereby we again contacted Miles Co. regarding payment. Floor
Coverings subsequently attached lien to property while disputes
regarding billing and service still existed.
After lien was filed, Miles Co. sent us a check for an amount
they determined was reasonable. We are still in possession of
this check and do not wish to redeem or endorse as it may absolve
Miles Co. of further liability. On March 23, 1990, we reached an
agreement with Floor Coverings regarding disputed invoice and
service.
We are in the process of attempting to have Miles Co. pay
interest, court fees, and attorney fees for which they are
responsible. At no time in the period from November 8, 1989 to
March 23, 1990 did we represent ourselves as anything but agents
of Miles Co., which we were duly authorized to be. During this
time, Miles Co. made no or little effort to pay the bill in a
timely manner nor did they attempt to resolve any billing
discrepancies in a timely manner. Floor Coverings by Certified
knew of the agency relationship between us and Miles Co., yet
they made no attempt to collect against Miles Co., who was the
bonded owner of the said property when said floor coverings were
installed.
Response to Allegations
#4 We were not the owners of property located at 773 S 825 E.
Layton when flooring was installed in said property.
Mtz ,-~«4-*.^,~+. uac. np\/pr entered into by us with Floor Coverings.

#16 Never at any time did we act as general contractor. We were
authorized by general contractor (Miles Co.) to act as an agent
to procure floor covering.
#21 General contractor did obtain bond for work performed.
#30 We were not unjustly enriched as we paid general contractor
for floor coverings when we purchased the property.

Stacey B. and Kristin P. Morgan

:

Recommended Forms of Notary Certificates

The Utah Notary Public Guide. The Laws of Utah and You.
State of Utah, Department of Business Regulation, Division
of Corporation & Commercial Code. Spring 1988.

A. If the signer is personally known to the notary:
C. If the signer took an oath vouching for the truthfulness of the document.
In the County of
this

, State of Utah, on
day of

, 19

,

In the County of

before me, the undersigned notary, personally appeared
(signer's name)

, State of Utah, on this

of
, who is

personally known by mc to be the person whose name is signed on the

19

day

, before me, the undersigned

notary, personally appeared

(signer's name)

who is personally known to me on "who proved to me his/her identity

preceding document, and acknowledged to mc that he /she signed it

through documentary evidence in the form of a

voluntarily for its staled purpose.

to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and
who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and the
document truthful.

Notary signature and seal
Notary signature and seal
B. If the signer proved his/her identity through documentary evidence:
D. If notarizing that the document is a true and correct copy of the original:
In the County of
day of

, State of Utah, on this
, 19

,

before me, die undersigned notary, personally appeared
name)

In the County of
(signer's

, who proved to mc his/her identity through

documentary evidence in the form of a

day of

, State of Utah, on the
19

, I certify that the preceding document

is a true, complete, and unaltered photocopy made by
of

(description of document)

to be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document, and
acknowledged to mc that he/she signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose.
Notary signature and seal
Notary signature and seal
11

.

Paul Franklin Farr (#1040)
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 540
BUSCH FORUM
5295 South 320 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711
Telephone: (801) 263-5555
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH

FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED,
INC.,

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S E
PARTE MOTION FOR EXTENSION (
TIME TO FILE APPEAL

)

Civil No. 900747303CN

)

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Plaintiff,
V.

STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN
P. MORGAN,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs Ex-Parte Motion for an Order to extend the time within which the
Plaintiff may file an appeal having come on regularly before this Court, and after due
consideration, with good cause appearing therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Plaintiff s Motion for an Order extending the time period within which
the Plaintiff is to file an appeal is granted.

2.

The time by which the Plaintiff must file an appeal is extended to thirty
(30) days past the prescribed time period or ten (10) past the date of
the entry of this Order, whichever occurs later.

DATED this 0-^

•x" day of November, 1991.
BY THE COURT

District Court Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the ~ '

day of November, 1991, Plaintiff mailed a true and correct

copy of the foregoing ORDER first class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Steve C. Vanderlinden, Esq.
1133 North Main, Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041

1

DJ

2
3
4

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

5

IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

6
7
8
9

FLOORCOVERINGS BY CERTIFIED,
INC. ,

10
Plaintiff,
11
12
13
14

Case No. 900747303

vs.
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN
P. MORGAN,
Defendant.

15
16

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L CORNABY

17

MAY 31, 1991

18

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

19

COURT'S RULING

20

(Partial Transcript)

21
22
23
24
25

Reported by:

ns. rr oi-

Ah r

KELLY BROWN HICKEN,
CSR, RPR

1

Reporter's Transcript of Court's Ruling, taken at Davis

2

County, Utah, on Friday, May 31, 1991, before KELLY

3

BROWN HICKEN, Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered

4

Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and

5

State of Utah.

for the

6
7
8

* * * * *

9
10
11

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:

12

FOR PLAINTIFF:

PAUL FRANKLIN FARR
Attorney at Law
5295 South 320 West, Suite 540
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

FOR DEFENDANT:

STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN
Attorney at Law
1133 North Main, Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041

13
14
15
16

9
0

3
4
5

FARMINGTON, UTAH, FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1991

1
2
3
4

* * * * *

THE COURT:

The Court will make the following findings

and decision in this matter:
First, the Court does not find a contract between

5
6

the plaintiff and defendants.

It's clear from the believable

7

testimony given to the Court that the defendants believed

8

they were contracting with Don Smith.

9

he was contracting with the defendants.

The plaintiff believed

But the fact that they each believed they were

10
11

contracting with somebody else doesn't mean there's a

12

contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants.

13

Don Smith has not been made a party to this action,

14

so nothing the Court says with regard to him has any binding

15

effect on his legal interests.

16

has not been made a party to the action, and so, of course,

17

nothing I say has any binding effect on Miles Construction

18

Company.

19

Miles Construction Company

The defendants were not acting as agents for

20

Miles Construction Company.

21

the actual owner of the lot at the time the work was done.

22

They had entered into an earnest money agreement with the

23

defendants to purchase that lot —

24

purchase the lot and the house that was being built on it.

25

Richard Miles testified that having reviewed his

Miles Construction Company was

or I should say to

1

files, he could see where there was a $1,206 flooring

2

allotment.

3

Company which is a corporation determined that the amount

4

apparently had been agreed to be higher than that.

5

amount ultimately paid the defendants for that work was

6

$1500.

7

Apparently those who work with Miles Construction

The

The defendants became owners of the property on

8

November 24th, 1989, when the closing was signed.

No matter

9

what the defendants believed, the Court does not find that

10

Don Smith ordered the vinyl and carpet from the plaintiff,

11

nor was he an agent for the defendants.

12

air conditioning repaired, and the defendants agreed to

13

scratch his back if they, in turn, could get their back

14

scratched.

Don Smith needed his

15

Defendant Stacey Morgan has testified that he gave

16

him some air conditioning worth approximately 1200 for which

17

he paid $800, which in the company he had a right to do. And

18

for that, he just expected that the defendant —

19

defendant.

20

same thing for him when it came to carpeting.

not the

He expected that Don Smith was going to do the
As I say,

21

J carpeting, I mean carpeting and vinyl.

22

I

23

I defendants believed they were contracting with Don Smith.

24

I Don Smith was walking a tight rope.

25

| to believe that he was selling carpet without going through a

I believe the actual agreement was that the

He didn't want retailers

1

retailer, and so he went to the plaintiff and asked the

2

plaintiff to do him a favor by supplying carpet and vinyl to

3

the defendants at a given price.

4

The defendants have testified that they had a set

5

price of $10.75 per yard installed for carpet and 9.75 per

6

yard for vinyl.

7

Plaintiff on the other hand, and the Court's not

8

sure where he got his information from because I'm not

9

persuaded he got it from the defendants.

I think he — Well,

10

he may have got his information from Don Smith.

11

believed that he was to supply vinyl at 9.75 per yard, which,

12

of course, is the same, and carpeting at 11.25 per yard, each

13

of those being the installed price.

14

contract between the plaintiff and defendants.

15

But he

That means there's no

The defendants have acknowledged since this case

16

first began that they were —

17

at least at all times after November 24th, 1989, they were

18

the owners of the property.

19

house, they also paid Miles Construction Company for the

20

installation of the flooring; that the amount they were

21

talking about was $1500, though I'm not sure the defendants

22

even knew the figure at that time, but that's the figure that

23

Miles Construction ultimately gave them.

24
25

at the time the lien was filed,

That when they paid for that

Richard Miles who seems to say at the time that the
I defendants were trying to get their carpet and vinyl

zn Court Reporter

installed, they had a figure of 1206 or $1,206 to work from.
In my finding I don't think it makes any difference.
Ultimately, they were paid many months after this
action was filed.

Probably in the month of June 1990, the

defendants were paid $1500 by Miles Construction Company for
the flooring.
It's clear from the evidence that the carpet was
installed beginning on November 15th, 1989.

It took three

days to install it, was finished on November 17th, 1989.
It's clear the plaintiff has a regular procedure
which he used in this case to collect, which is when he
finishes a job, he bills the parties for it and expects
immediate payment.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is the contract or at least
it's a contract form dated November the 8th, 1989, that is
sent to the —

I suppose it's a document that was sent to the

defendants showing the amount of $2,115 due and owing.
His next procedure he says is when he doesn't
receive pay as soon as he thinks he should, about 30 days
later, he makes a phone call, which he did.
That sometime after that, he sends them out a
preliminary notice that he's going to file a lien, and he did
that on January 3rd, 1990, by Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. And
then he has a lien drawn which he files on January 19th,
1990, dated the same day which he asks specifically for the
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1

amount of $2,115.

2

Now, there's been a considerable amount of

3

controversy here on what the value of the work done was. I

4

don't think there's any question from the testimony given

5

that the defendants believed that they were being charged too

6

much right from the beginning.

7

Plaintiff has urged the Court to find that there

8

was accord and satisfaction as evidenced by the answer filed

9

on April 9th, 1990, specifically the third paragraph which

10

said "On March 23rd, 1990, we reached an agreement with

11

Floorcoverings regarding disputed invoice and service."

12

Now, this action was filed on March 15th, 1990. I

13

don't recall right offhand the date the 2,040 was actually

14

sent.

Wasn't it in June?

15

MR. FARR:

16

MR. VANDERLINDEN:

17

THE COURT:

June.
It was, your Honor.

Do you remember the dates?

18

remember the dates?

19

MR. FARR:

20

THE COURT:

Somebody

June 12th is when I received it.
Plaintiff received it on June 12th, of

21

course, and it was payable to Mr. Farr personally apparently

22

at his request.

23

document or that amount at apparently counsel's suggestion.

24

It was held until there was a judgment taken on the case.

25

And- shortly thereafter, then it was applied toward the

I'm aware that the plaintiff accepted that

1

judgment.

2

If one looks at that as an accord and satisfaction,

3

certainly, then, the acceptance of that $2,040 ended the suit

4

right then and there for 2,040 for everything.

5

finds that there was no accord and satisfaction.

6

have been if the parties had been willing to agree at that

7

time.

8

The Court
There could

Defendants have acknowledged from the beginning

9

they owed some money.

They have disputed the amount. Now,

10

the Court's allowed —

we've taken testimony from several

11

people.

12

the plaintiff testified that the vinyl was 50 yards at 9.75

13

or $9.75 per yard which is $487.50.

14

The plaintiff or at least Mr. Delahunty on behalf of

And all of these you're going to have, if my math

15

is right, my figures will be right. And if they're not, it's

16

just a math error.

17
18

Carpet at 11.25 at 130 yards 1,462.50 for a total
of 1,950.

19

Plaintiff acknowledged an error in calculating the

20

carpeting which all of the parties have agreed was in error,

21

recalculated it and later giving a $75 credit to the

22

defendants.

23

the final amount at 11.25 per yard which is $1,387.47 plus

24

the vinyl makes it a total at that time of 1,874.94.

25

I

123.33 yards is the figure that I accepted as

Now, through all of these calculations that I give

a. | to you, I'm always going to use the figures of 9.75 for the
2

vinyl and 11.25 for the carpet, irrespective of the fact that

3

the defendants testified they think there contract is for

4

10.75.

5

no contract between the parties.

6

be a reasonable amount to be awarded for the vinyl and 11.25

7

to be a reasonable amount to be awarded for the carpet.

I do that because I've previously found that there is

8
9
10

And I believe the 9.75 to

Dennis Vanderlinden figured carpet at 121.33 yards
which figures out at $1,364.97.

He figured the vinyl at

40 yards which comes to $390 for a total of $1754.97.

11

David Seare figured the vinyl at 42 yards — or

12

45 yards.

13

"Does that mean 42 yards?"

14

45 yards to 48 yards."

15

42 yards.

16

He says give or take three yards.
And he said "No.

And I said
That means

So he distinctly said it didn't mean

That's my understanding.
I figured his at 45 because that is the figure he

17

used.

That's the figure he determined.

And when he gave

18

that testimony, he said that 45 yard measurement included in

19

the area of the cabinets and included the counting of pattern

20

match.

21

vinyl, $1374.75 for the carpet which was at 122.2 yards for a

22

total of $1813.50.

So David Seare figures I have at $438.75 for the

23

Dean Chidester figured the vinyl at 40 yards for

24

$390, 118.67 yards of carpet for $1335.04 for a total of

25

$1725.04.

So the difference between the high and the low,

3\z[[u ^Rxourn cJrick&n Court Reporter

1

this is just roughly $150 with four different people giving

2

the figures.

3

Now, the plaintiff has argued that as long as you

4

file a lien it doesn't matter how much you claim because

5

that's not important,

6

It seems to the Court it's just very essentially

7

important in a case of this nature.

The lien filed in this

8

case asks for $2,115. And apparently from the beginning, the

9

defendants are saying it's too high.

The plaintiff comes to

10

a point of acknowledging a math error and acknowledges it

11

should be $2,040 because it's $75 too high.

12

Different carpet measurers measure it differently.

13

And as I say, four of them have come up with four different

14

figures ranging from a high and a low to just $150

15

difference.

16

Now, for this total lawsuit, that seems almost

17

insignificant.

But to the defendants, it's not

18

insignificant.

You're talking about an allowance by Miles

19

Construction of $1500 for a total project, and in a claim by

20

the plaintiff for $2,040. And this figure lies between the

21

two.

22

off the taxes and the preparation fee that I think are

23

appropriate sums.

And I recognize I have not left —

I deliberately left

I just haven't included them on this

24

I because I would think that when we get through, the $40

25

| preparation and the sales tax need to be added onto this no

a/ rr rz^
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1

matter what figure the Court ultimately uses.

2

And I don't think Dennis Vanderlinden was

3

discredited in any way because he has been associated with

4

his brother.

5

Chidester or the plaintiff.

6

the Court can see, they were all four people trying to

7

honestly tell what they thought it looked like to them.

8
9

But then neither is David Seare or Dean
They're all very —

Now, with regard to the lien.
important aspect of this case.

as far as

That's a very

The amount in the notice of

10

lien is incorrect at $2,115.

Even in the plaintiff's best

11

view of it, it should be $2,040.

12

defendants were not the owners of the house at the time they

13

asked the work to be done.

14

contract for purchasing, and nobody's presented the Court

15

with a copy of that so I know whether it had been accepted by

16

Miles Construction so that it was a binding contract between

17

the parties.

18

it was because it wound up being on November 24th an actual

19

contract that was consummated.

20

binding on the plaintiffs prior if the house had been

21

appropriately finished as apparently they agreed on.

22

don't know concerning what their negotiations were in that

23

area.

I've said that the

But they had at that time a valid

But in ruling, the Court kind of assumes that

That doesn't mean it wasn't

We just

24

Now, the lien statute is there to protect anybody

25

who, in this case the plaintiff, supplies something to that

1

house, but that it requires a bond.

2

whether there was a bond in place in this case or not.

3

Court knows nobody's testified to no bond being in place.

4

And we really don't know
The

Miles Construction Company didn't want to be

5

responsible because they had not made the contract.

6

Don Smith didn't want to be responsible because he claimed he

7

wasn't selling either vinyl or carpet, just doing a favor by

8

persuading the plaintiff to do it.

9

protects those people furnishing it.

But the law still
And so the Court's

10

assuming there was no bond.

11

matter that with most homes that are personally built, there

12

are not bonds obtained for them even though the statute

13

requires it.

14

Of course, I know as a practical

Now, the lien was filed within a reasonable period

15

of time.

16

time after the work was done on November 17th.

17

doesn't really require privity.

18

contractor who subcontracts or who hires the work done, not

19

the owner.

20

and work on a job, the lien statute doesn't require there to

21

be a privity.

22

January 19th was reasonable within the statutory
The statute

Many times it's the

But to protect those people who supply material

The current lien statute, and that's 38-1-7, and

23

I'm not going to read the whole thing.

24

list those things, and I'm not going to read all of them that

25

the plaintiff listed in there.

Paragraph (2) does

It says the statement

/-._„..„„ ^±l;rhEn
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1

containing the day; the reputed owner.

2

owner, if you don't know that, the record owner.

3

If not the reputed

I believe that was correctly stated at the time. I

4

think the plaintiff had enough interest —

5

had enough interest in it and the plaintiff had no

6

association with the contractor/owner at the time.

7

when he checked the lien to see —

8

recorder and so onto see who was the owner, it was listed as

9

the defendants.

10

or the defendants

And that

or check the county

So I think he did that one properly.

The name of the person by whom he was employed.

I

11

think that on the lien statute, he, of course, lists Stacey

12

and Kristin Morgan, and the Court has found that to be

13

incorrect, but I did find that he believed that they were the

14

ones that hired him.

15
16

Under (c), the time the first and last labor was
performed.

He does list the 15th and 17th of November.

17

(d), description of the property.

18

there, and nobody has argued anything except that it's

19

correct.

20

There is one

(e), given considerable amount of argument about

21

that.

22

agent, and an acknowledgment or certificate is required under

23

Chapter 3, Title 57. Then the statement "No acknowledgment

24

or certificate is required for any notice after April 29th,

25

1985, and before April 24th, 1989."

The signature of a lien claimant or his authorized

So that last sentence

has no application to this case because no work was done, no
lien was filed until after that period.

So you're left with

just the one statement, the signature of lien claimant or his
authorized agent and an acknowledgment or certificate.
It does show the authorized signature.
Floorcoverings by Certified Incorporated.

It's got

it's got the

secretary signature and seal, and you've got the authorized
officer as Allen Delahunty, and then you've got it notarized.
The Court understands that this is a deficient
certificate there.

It doesn't really enter that the

information is true.
intended,

I'm sure that's what the plaintiff

it does say "...who swore or affirmed to me that

he signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose, that the
document is truthful," and that he signed it on before of the
corporation.

I think that's deficient personally.

But it is

the notary, of course, saying that this officer said that to
him.
So I think there are three problems in the lien
notice of lien, and that's the ownership of the property, the
amount requested.

I'm not bothered by the fact that this

parenthesis it says "owner" and in another set of parenthesis
it says "contractor."

Those are standard documents that are

meant to have one or the other crossed out so that when you
sign them, you know who you're referring to.
it leaves them both there doesn't ~
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The fact that

the Court doesn't think

damages any.

So I think it's a deficient notice of lien for

those reasons.
I think the amount has to be correctly stated.
Now, I believe the plaintiff is entitled to be paid
for unjust enrichment, and the Court is not persuaded of
which of the four amounts submitted is better than another.
Whether it should be the lower figure of Mr. Chidester of
1725 or whether it should be the higher figure of the
plaintiff of 1875. And so I think a good resolution of that
is just order an amount right between those two figures which
is probably $1800.

That will be the order of the Court, plus

the $40 preparation plus the sales tax.
And I think because of the nature of what I've said
about this, each party should bear their own attorney's fees.
Anything else?
MR. VANDERLINDEN:
stand up.

Did you want me —

I apologize.

Excuse me.

I'll

Do you want me to prepare the

findings of fact and conclusions, your Honor?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. VANDERLINDEN:
THE COURT:

You can prepare them.
Thank you.

All right.

Do you have all the exhibits?

Which ones do you or don't have?
THE CLERK:

I need Defendants' 3 and 5.

THE REPORTER:

Here you go.

MR. VANDERLINDEN:

I'll need a copy of his findings of

facts.
THE COURT:

Anything by either counsel before we be in

adjournment?
MR. VANDERLINDEN:
MR. FARR:
THE COURT:

Nothing on behalf of the defendant.

We have nothing, your Honor.
All right.

Court will be adjourned.

Thank you.

That's all. The

The clerk will see that she has all

those documents before she quits.
(Whereupon, the court proceedings were concluded.)
* * * * *

